[The] Russian intervention gave the Communists a position they could never otherwise have held in Spain . . . The prestige of the International Brigade, which had saved Madrid, was another factor. Besides, it seemed that Stalin had been correct in thinking that a moderate Left-wing-line was the one which held the most future for his party. Unable to draw to themselves the manual workers, who remained firmly fixed in their unions, the Communists found themselves the refuge for all those who had suffered from the excesses of the Revolution . . . In Catalonia, where fear and hatred of the Anarchists was very strong, they were able to combine the various Socialist groups . . . into a single party, the PSUC, which was affiliated to the Comintern . . .
But it would be a mistake to suppose that the Communists owed their success merely to their control of Russian arms and to their dislike of social revolution. They had a dynamism that no other party in Government Spain possessed . . . With missionary fervour . . . they set out to conquer the traditional inertia and passivity of the Spanish bureaucratic temperament . . . But it was not easy for other parties to get on with them. They suffered from a fixed belief in their own superior knowledge and capacity. They were incapable of rational discussion. From every pore they exuded a rigid totalitarian spirit . . . To them winning the war meant winning it for the Communist party . . . Thus they kept the Aragon front without arms to spite the Anarchists and prevented a very promising offensive in Extremadura from taking place because the credit for its success might have gone to Caballero.
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